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ABSTRACT
Populism seems to be a well-established notion in public and
academic debate alike. Nevertheless, several issues surrounding
populism are still contested and thus merit closer attention.
These contested issues encompass the extent to which populism
is novel and ubiquitous; the scope of the phenomenon; the merits
of the various deﬁnitions of populism; its political colour(s); the
potential danger it poses to democracy; its appropriateness to
govern; as well as populism’s impact beyond national borders.
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Much has been said and written about populism, especially since Cas Mudde published
what proved to be a foundational article entitled the “The Populist Zeitgeist” (Mudde
2004). Undoubtedly, populism is currently one of the most popular topics in academia
and public debate, in coﬀee houses and on online posts, possibly only rivalled by global
warming, #metoo and sports. A quick search in Google Scholar for English language
publications using ‘populism’ or ‘populist’ in their titles, suggests that academic interest
in populism has proliferated since 2012 (see Figure 1).
On the one hand, there is reason to rejoice in such a lively discussion: to the extent
that populism is linked to the public’s interest in politics, it testiﬁes to the vibrancy of
open societies. On the other hand, it runs the risk of resembling the Tower of Babel: the
various ideas of what is meant by the very term populism has produced a situation in
which everyone is using the term, with diﬀerent people employing diﬀerent interpreta-
tions. The academic and public debate is thus ridden with contestation over various
issues regarding populism. This may run the risk of producing misunderstandings. In
this article, we seek to map out part of the confusion and identify such issues of
contestation in order to contribute to a coherent research agenda and a more fruitful
public debate. We address nine such issues.
Contested Issue 1: Is populism new?
Populism is sometimes presented as a new phenomenon, particularly in the public
debate in which opinion leaders have become involved since the success of populists in
Western Europe and, particularly, the rise of Donald Trump in the United States.
Indeed, while recognising that academics have addressed populism for some time,
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The Guardian questions why populism has become “sexy” particularly over the past
years (Rooduijn 2018). To be sure, populism has now reached new heights. In the
European context, populist parties are now found across the left/right political spec-
trum. Moreover, quite a few governments are founded on populist parties: Austria,
Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Norway boast such governments. In addition, it is sug-
gested that the wave has produced a new type of leadership: depending on how one
views populism, one could argue that populist leaders rule Bolivia, Ecuador, Hungary,
the Philippines, and the United States.
The most radical suggestion of the newness, found in both academia and the public
debate, is the suggestion that populism heralds the end of liberal democracy as we have
known it for most of the post-Second World War period, and ushers in a new type of
political system, sometimes called illiberal democracy, which rejects liberal elements
such as checks and balances and minority rights. This is the case in public as well as
academic debate: witness the manifesto of 30 intellectuals against populism (Libération
2019) and Yascha Mounk’s The People vs. Democracy (Mounk 2018).
Often, the economic and ﬁnancial crisis that started in 2007 is portrayed as a catalyst:
from this perspective, populism reﬂects the resistance of those who stood on the losing side
of globalisation and became aware of this when the ﬁnancial crunch came. The crisis thus
fed into feelings of insecurity that had been developing since 9/11 when the world, as the
West saw it, collapsed and Islam-inspired terrorism made many people afraid of plural
societies.
However, if we look over time, we ﬁnd that there has been a gradual, but signiﬁcant
increase in support for populist parties for some time now, well preceding the ﬁnancial
crisis and even 9/11. If we look at aggregate numbers, populist radical right parties were
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Figure 1. Scholarly publications with populism or populist in title (2000-18). Numbers are
cumulative.
Source: Google Scholar (authors' own calculations)
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already gaining 10 percent of the vote in the 1990s (see Figure 2). On average, by then,
they were already doing better than Green political parties. To be sure, there were fewer
populist left parties at that time. However, to imply that populist parties are a new
phenomenon is empirically not correct. It is important to note that if we tally up left
and right populism, we see more populists than ever. In some extreme cases, such as in
Italy, populist parties can compose up to 50 percent of the vote (in both the 2013 and
2018 elections). Nevertheless, one should be careful not to speak of an explosion of
populism.
Indeed, populism far precedes the post-Cold War era. To the extent that it is philosophi-
cally related to the ideals of the Enlightenment centring around radical forms of direct
democracy (going back to Rousseau and possibly Calvin), populism has long been present
inmovements and parties that have embraced such forms of direct democracy. It was present
in some of the ideas of the French Revolution; it was present in the radical council ideas at the
turn of the 19th century and again in the 1968 movement; it was present in the push for
decentralisation and referenda in many countries after World War II. In as much as it is in
some ways philosophically related to an almost pre-modern longing for an Arcadian society
in which the people are a self-suﬃcient community, the American Populist Party
(19th century), the French Poujadists (1950s), Argentine Peronism (1945-55 and 1973-74),
the Dutch Farmers’ Party (1960s/1970s) and possibly Nordic anti-tax parties (1970s) belong
to that tradition.
Contested Issue 2: Is populism ubiquitous?
Populism seems to be dramatically on the rise, indeed ubiquitous.However, this is not the case
and often emanates from contested deﬁnitions of populism (see below). This leads to
a paradoxical ﬁnding: whereas populism is less present than is often claimed, it is also more
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Figure 2. Average vote (%) for the populist radical right, populist radical left, and Green parties in
Western Europe in national elections between 1990 and 2016.
Source: Wolinetz and Zaslove 2018b, 5 (reprinted with permission).
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present than is often claimed (Hawkins et al. 2017). Let’s ponder theﬁrst claim:many actors or
events are considered to be populist while in essence they are not populist at all. Three
examples serve to illustrate: ﬁrstly, some claim that, in 2016, US presidential candidateDonald
Trump, Jr. was campaigning as a populist. For example, Kirk Hawkins and Levente Littvay
(forthcoming) argue that trump is “half populist”, scoring higher on anti-elitism than on
people-centrism; secondly, dramatic events such as Brexit are often considered to be evidence
of populism; and thirdly,mainstreampoliticians are often described as populists (Iakhnis et al.
2018). For instance, the media often portray Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte as populist
since he uses ‘folksy’ expressions such as “sod oﬀ”when speaking about badly behaving youth
(Korteweg 2018).
However, in these examples use of the term populism obfuscates the issues and
hinders the development of a precise meaning of the term. In essence, Trump’s
populism is a borderline case (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018): analysis shows
that Trump was less populist at the beginning of his campaign. He became more
populist later when he made explicit claims to represent the people versus the corrupt
elite. The latter is the litmus test if we are to claim that Trump is a populist (see below).
Regarding Brexit, although many actors such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP)
and arguments used to support Brexit may be considered populist, it would be a stretch
of the imagination to call the entire Brexit movement populist. Indeed, Brexit itself is
part of a broader debate over issues that are not populist in and of themselves, ranging
from immigration and economic sovereignty to a surge in English nationalism after the
2014 Scottish independence referendum (Colantone and Stanig 2018; Dennison and
Geddes 2018). Last, if mainstream politicians such as Rutte tap into popular sentiments,
this is not enough to qualify them as populist.
This brings us to an important diﬀerence between being a populist and being close to
the people. In this respect, Luke March has made a very useful distinction between
populism and demoticism. The latter refers to being close to the people; it denotes using
a common language and suggests the connotation of being part of the people. As March
writes,
What passes for ‘mainstream’ or ‘thin’ populism is not really populism at all but demoti-
cism (closeness to ordinary people), which is necessary, but by no means suﬃcient for
populism. Therefore, analysts should not call parties ‘rather populist’ just because their
rhetoric is demotic (March 2017, 284).
Demoticism is diﬀerent from populism insofar as it does not employ the antagonism
between the people and the elite: being part of the people is not one and the same thing
as being anti-elitist.
Although many actors who are often seen as populist thus are, in fact, not populist, we
have to be equally careful not to deny the presence of populism when it is actually present.
Because of our focus on political parties and individual politicians, we overlook the possibility
that populism is present elsewhere in society, particularly in civil society organisations and
more broadly amongst the population in their political attitudes. Examples from civil society
are the OccupyMovement across the globe (Gould-Wartofsky 2015), which was preceded by
the Indignados movement in Spain (Castañeda 2012).
Underlying the rise of populists as distinct political actors is often a cultural undercurrent
that oﬀers fecund soil for political populism to prosper. The intellectuals’ Nuova Destra
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(New Right) movement in Italy is a case in point (Capra Casadio 2014). Similarly, the US Tea
Party, a grass roots organisation that operates within the Republican Party, is based on an
intellectual movement that combines traditional ideas about sovereign individuals uniting
against a strong (federal) state with conservative religious ideas (Skocpol and Williamson
2016). On the left, populism has intellectual roots in the works of Chantal Mouﬀe (Mouﬀe
2018), for example, and the group of intellectuals around Pablo Iglesias (Kioupkiolis 2016),
laying the foundation for Podemos (We Can) in Spain.
Indeed, populism is present more broadly among the population than is often
appreciated. This is borne out by new developments in measuring populism in
Europe as well as in Latin America (see Akkerman et al. 2014; 2017; Hawkins et al.
2018). Political scientists have been measuring populist attitudes in a variety of contexts
for some time with remarkable results: ﬁrst, populist attitudes are found not only in
countries where there are populist parties, but also in countries without populist parties
(Hawkins et al. 2018). Second, citizens who are more populist in attitude are more likely
to vote for a populist party but may also vote for non-populist parties (Akkerman et al.
2014). Populism may thus be more dormant and bigger than is often claimed, reinfor-
cing the claim in the previous section that populism may not be new, but rather a more
permanent feature of parts of the electorate. The question that should be addressed is:
how and under what conditions is it mobilised?
Contested Issue 3: Can we agree on what populism means?
Diﬀerent conceptualisations of populism abound in the scientiﬁc and popular literature.
Often these diﬀerences are presented as a debate between irreconcilable camps. We
maintain, however, that this need not be the case. Rather, diﬀerent conceptualisations
may lead to diﬀerent, yet relevant and sometimes related, research questions (cf. Miller-
Idriss 2019).
1) Populism is sometimes equated with politicians who promise (and give) the
people what they want. This would identify populism with political opportunism.
Actually, this is the Cambridge Dictionary deﬁnition. However, this categorisation
makes it very hard to distinguish populism as a separate phenomenon: most politicians
take an opportunity when they see one and are prepared to cater to voters’ preferences.
Few, however, would be so opportunistic as to risk the political damage of being seen as
inconsistent and unreliable. Every politician is interested in power, but will seek it on
the basis of a fairly consistent and stable political platform, which puts limits on the
ease with which they can alter their position.
2) Populism is sometimes deﬁned as a political strategy (Weyland 2017).This remains
close to the opportunist notion of populism, but clearly diﬀers from it in that the
strategic objective (gaining power) is achieved via a consistent hammering on speciﬁc
issues such as security, protectionism, and/or strong leadership. Nevertheless, the
tendency of politicians to emphasize such themes is hardly new. It thus cannot explain
the current (and past) popularity of populist movements and parties. However, it does
help us understand the behaviour displayed by various mainstream parties that compete
with populist parties: they often emulate both the rhetoric (although playing it down
somewhat) and the issues of populists, and thus are often ‘accused’ of being populists
themselves, particularly by anti-populists (see for example, Van Klingeren et al. 2017).
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In the Dutch parliamentary election campaign of 2017, Liberal Party leader (and Prime
Minister) Mark Rutte took it so far as to declare that his party, the People‘s Party for
Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) represents
“good populism” (NOS 2017). The concept of populist strategy may thus be a relevant
concept in studying populism.
3) Third, it is sometimes claimed that populism represents the antagonism towards
the elite felt by the broader public. Most would maintain that populists are anti-
incumbent, anti-establishment, and/or anti-mainstream. Indeed, reduced electoral turn
out, lack of trust in government or even feelings of resentment are often invoked to
describe the playing ﬁeld of populists (cf. Sikk 2009; Barr 2009). Yet, only seldom is
populism identiﬁed with anti-system movements or parties, such as the communist or
Gaullist parties of the past, even though Italy’s Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle,
M5S) and Spain’s Podemos have been described as anti-system (cf. Bickerton and
Invernizzi Accetti 2018).
Nevertheless, if we embrace this conceptualisation we run the risk of identifying
populism exclusively with sentiments felt by the people towards their rulers. In doing so,
we would not be able to understand what such citizens seek from a political system that
they are dissatisﬁed with, but do not wish to overthrow altogether. This requires a notion of
populism that encompasses leaders as well as followers and is capable of proposing
a political programme beyond the total rejection of the political system.
4) The notion of populism as a “thin-centered ideology” (cf. Mudde 2017) is capable of
meeting the shortcomings of the previous conceptualisations. This notion is ideological
because it claims that all populists present politics as a conﬂict between those they conceive
to be the pure people and the corrupt, or evil elite. In this sense, it sometimes harks back to
Rousseau-like notions of the general will (Mudde 2017, 33-34) or invokes a diﬀerent, pre-
modernist notion of an Arcadian society. However, the ideology is thin-centred because the
juxtaposition of people and elite does not in itself produce a comprehensive outlook on
society. Hence, populists borrow elements from existing ideologies (socialism, liberalism,
conservatism, Christian democracy, environmentalism) and marry them consistently with
their baseline: the people-elite juxtaposition. This focus on ideology has two analytical
advantages: ﬁrst, ideology is a property that applies both to leaders, their movements and
parties, as well as to their followers. It thus encompasses much of the other populist
conceptualisations; second, it allows for a comparative study without having to give in to
the idea that every populist movement is idiosyncratic because of unique temporal and
geographic circumstances (cf. Halikiopoulou 2019, who combines populism’s thin ideology
with nationalism).
All in all, we can roughly agree on what populism means: populism is something
very speciﬁc, primarily a set of ideas (Mudde 2017). We need not be troubled by most
other conceptualisations: starting with the notion of thin-centred ideology, we can
ignore opportunism, we can allow for strategy (mainly as a response of populist
opponents), we can study voters, politicians, movements as well as parties.
Importantly, embracing the thin-centred ideology notion, we have a proper tool for
comparative analysis across time and space (cf. Mudde 2017, 38).
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Contested Issue 4: Is populism right-wing?
In the past, research into populism, especially its European variety, focused on radical right-
wingpopulism. It remains unclearwhy this is the case: it could be the longstanding fear of neo-
fascism; perhaps the presumed parallel between democracy’s weakness in the interbellum and
illiberal democracy today; perhaps the appearance of and suggested need for strong leaders.
This emphasis seems odd, given that populism in the United States started rather as an
agriculturalmovement, and that early LatinAmerican populism (e.g., Peronism) seemed to be
in a class of its own. Indeed, early comparative academic work on populism (Ionescu and
Gellner 1968; Canovan 1981) presented a broad notion of the concept.
An emphasis on radical right populism had two disadvantages: ﬁrst, it ignored the
possibility of other manifestations of populism such as left-wing populism; second, it created
an analytical straitjacket into which ‘deviant cases’ had to ﬁt, for instance, Dutch Pim
Fortuyn’s List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) was classiﬁed as right-wing because of its migration
policies, but eﬀectively displayed a mixture of liberal and social-democratic ideologies.
The concept of a thin-centred ideology serves to tackle this problem and it does so in two
ways. First, all populist parties share a notion of the pure people versus the corrupt elite.
However, these notions may, and do, vary across parties: right-wing populists often have
a nativist perspective on the pure people and decry the ruling class as the enemy; left-wing
populists often deﬁne the pure people in terms of class or the underprivileged, juxtaposing
them to ﬁnancial and business elites (See Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). Note that
this may transcend the classical class divide, as speciﬁc entrepreneurs, and speciﬁc ethnic
groups (e.g., in Bolivia or Ecuador) may be victims of global capital as well.
Second, all populist parties have to borrow from other ideologies in order to be able to
present a comprehensive perspective on society and politics. Indeed, some borrow from
liberalism [e.g., the Dutch LPF or Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI, Go Italy); Alberto Fujimori
in Peru; John Howard in Australia]; other may borrow from socialism [e.g., Podemos in
Spain or Syriza (Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás, Coalition of the Radical Left) in
Greece; Hugo Chavez in Venezuela; Rafael Correa in Ecuador]. Yet, others may take
their ideological cues from regionalism [like the Lega Nord (Northern League) in Italy in
the 1980s or Vlaams Blok (VB, Flemish Block) in Belgium in the 1990s] or nationalism
[Fidesz (Magyar Polgári Szövetség, Hungarian Civic Alliance) in Hungary]. Populism can be
found on the left and the right of the political spectrum.
Contested Issue 5: Is populism a danger?
Most qualiﬁcations of populism in the media have a negative ring to them. This can be
cast in disapproving or more pejorative wordings. In a disapproving formula this is
done by portraying populists as ‘irresponsible’ or ‘unﬁt to govern’. They are not
expected to be prepared to practice the art of the possible and accept compromises,
and are thus declared unﬁt to govern. At best, populists are seen as giving voice to
unspoken criticism, but in the end they threaten the daily art of deal-making, partly also
because they polarise public debate with their divisive debating style. In more pejorative
language, populists are depicted as xenophobic, racist or anti-democratic (e.g., Tisdall
2018). Sometimes populists are likened to actors of the fascist and Nazi regimes of the
1920s to 1940s. In this context, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s suggestion that
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‘good populism’ does exist (meaning mainstream parties that listen to the people) is
a rare exception in the public debate.
In academia, populism is generally treated with proper academic distance, but here
also it is sometimes seen as a threat to stable democracy, especially because of the
polarising eﬀect of populist views (Galston 2018; Mounk 2018). Populism’s success is
seen as contributing to the fragmentation of political systems. And even in academia,
the alleged current rise of illiberal democracy, the continued lack of trust in politicians,
as well as the rise of strong leaders have prompted comparisons to the interbellum
when the competition from totalitarian ideologies and polarisation, combined with
fragmentation, spelled the collapse of a number of democracies in Europe and Latin
America (cf. Berman 2016).
Undoubtedly, from the point of view of political theory, one can and should question
the position taken by any political movement or party, hence also of populists. And,
certainly, objections can be raised with regard to speciﬁc populist positions. However,
the preoccupation with populism should not exempt us from considering the possible
positive eﬀects it may have (had) on democracy (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017).
There are at least three:
(1) Populist parties can shake up party systems where government has long been
dominated by the same (combination of) parties. In democratic theory, alterna-
tion is an important feature of democratic systems. Robert Dahl (1971) even
deﬁned alternation (public contestation) as one of the deﬁning characteristics of
“real life democracies” or polyarchies. In several democracies, this quality had
been weakened by the late 1980s: for example, until 1992, Social Democrats
dominated Swedish governments; until 1994, Italian governments were domi-
nated by the Christian Democratic Party (DC), which regularly changed one
junior coalition partner after another; Christian Democrats also dominated
coalitions in the Netherlands until 1994. In other countries, such as Austria
and Germany, some major parties alternated in government but kept outsiders
out. Populist parties ended this real or perceived dominance of established
parties and added options for alternation. One could even go so far as to argue
that in Italy the populist parties made possible the formation of a legitimate
centre-right government that would not automatically be discarded as marginal
or neo-fascist.
(2) Populism can give voice to those who are not represented (Mudde and Rovira
Kaltwasser 2017): the presumably reduced salience of the classical, clear-cut left/
right and religious and social cleavages has left quite a portion of the electorate
without a natural harbour. Also, regional integration and economic and ﬁnancial
globalisation have bereft voters – especially those on the losing side – of the idea
that national governments are in control and will act as a ‘safety net of last
resort’. This has contributed to a feeling among such voters of not being
represented by the system and its major parties, reinforced by the mainstream
parties that still pretend to be in control of society and its economy. Populists
oﬀer a harbour to such wandering citizens because they provide a clear explana-
tion (the national elite! The global ﬁnancial elite! The eurocrats!) and promise
a return to control by hammering on national sovereignty and instruments of
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direct democracy. The example par excellence here is the Italian Five Star
Movement. By presenting a critical Italian voice in Brussels and elements of
a deliberative democracy at home, M5S has oﬀered rescue to those who feel
abandoned by the traditional Italian left and who feared Berlusconi’s liberal
populism.
(3) Populism can improve political responsiveness (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser
2017). The rising popularity of populist parties in the polls may cause other
parties and governments to move closer to populist positions. Populists’ contin-
uous pounding on the perceived threat of migration has caused most govern-
ments to develop stricter migration policies, at both the national and European
level (Swedish migration policies surrounding the 2018 elections are a case in
point). The rise of anti-EU sentiments, often voiced by populists, has coincided
with a tougher position of many EU member states on EU integration; this has
been the case particularly in the Netherlands since the 2005 referendum on the
European constitutional treaty (cf. Odmalm and Hepburn 2017). Mainstream
parties thus have become more responsive to distinct parts of the electorate.
Interestingly, in most countries this increased responsiveness has seldom led to
a weakening of populist parties.
Importantly, these eﬀects of populism are achieved in diﬀerent ways in diﬀerent systems:
populist parties are more likely to proﬁt from electoral systems that approach pure propor-
tional representation. In majoritarian systems, alternation seems to be institutionalised in the
system itself. Populists thus have more diﬃculty in giving voice to the unrepresented.
Sometimes they have to wait for opportunities such as the European Parliament elections,
which provide proportional representation (which explains the relative successes of UKIP in
the UK and FN in France), ormoments of direct democracy such as referenda (e.g., the Brexit
referendum in 2016). Sometimes they have to operate from within the system: the Tea Party
exploiting the Republican Party as a vehicle for its ideas; or, to the extent that they can be
considered populists, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders deciding to seek power through
established parties rather than as independent candidates – the latter a guarantee for failure in
the American majoritarian system.
Contested Issue 6: Are populists unﬁt to govern?
In the media, populists are often presented as unﬁt to participate in government. In the
2000s, The Economist has run several covers suggesting Italian populists are incapable
of governing: on the occasion of the 2013 Italian elections, the cover depicted
Berlusconi and Grillo as two clowns (The Economist 2013). Although they may have
positive qualities in shaking up the system and giving voice to previously neglected
citizens, many commentators would not recommend populists in government because
they thrive on polarisation and fear losing electoral support if they compromise on
issues. Indeed, some commentators would stretch that argument and claim that one
should incorporate populists in government because it would expose their lack of
responsibility and their proclivity to conﬂict, or turn them into mainstream parties –
all arguments that presumably would lead to a weakening of support for populist
parties. Populist governments are thus expected to be short-lived. Yet, looking at the
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empirical record, we ﬁnd many examples of governments in which populist parties of
all sorts have participated (either formally or in an explicitly supportive role) (see
Table 1).
Several observations are in order: ﬁrst, populist parties are regular participants in
government. The Swiss case is peculiar because of the consociational arrangement of its
Federal Council. Second, very few governments with populists are really short-lived.
While this was clearly the case for the ﬁrst Berlusconi government in Italy (1994) and
the ﬁrst Balkenende government in the Netherlands (2002) and possibly also for the
ﬁrst Rutte government in the Netherlands (2010-12), these constitute a minority of all
governments supported by populists. Third, populists do not seem to be punished by
participating in government, neither by their coalition partners nor by the electorate.
The only exception being the Netherlands: both the LPF’s and PVV’s participation in
two short-lived governments was partly motivated by the intention of mainstream
parties (Christian Democrats and Liberals) to try to ﬁght populists by either turning
them into mainstream parties or showing their irresponsibility. Having been blamed for
the governments’ collapse, both LPF and PVV fell back in the elections held immedi-
ately afterward.
Table 1. Populists in government in Europe
Country Type of populist party
Radical right Liberal Left wing Maverick*
Austria FPÖ, Freiheitliche Partei
Österreichs,
Freedom Party (2000-03;
2003-07; 2017-present)
BZÖ, Bündnis Zukunft Österreich,
Alliance for the Future of
Austria (2005-07)
Denmark DF, Danske Folkeparti (2000-11)**
Greece SYRIZA (2015-
present)
Finland True Finns, Perussuomalaiset,
PS (2015-17)
Hungary Fidesz (1998-2002; 2010-
present)
Italy Lega Nord (2001-06; 2008-11;
2018-present)
FI/PdL, Popolo della Libertà,
People of Freedom (1994;
2001-06; 2008-11)
Lega Nord
(1994)
M5S (2018-
present)
Netherlands PVV, Partij voor de Vrijheid,
Freedom Party (2010-12)**
LPF (2002)
Norway Progress Party Fremskrittspartiet,
FrP (2013-present)
Slovakia SMER, Sociálna
Demokracia,
Social
Democracy
(2006-10)
Switzerland SVP, Schweizerische Volkspartei,
Swiss People’s Party (1929-
2007; 2008-present)
*Maverick parties combine elements of the other types. In 1994, the Lega Nord, as of 2018 simply Lega (League), was
more regionalist than radical right; M5S presents such a diverse combination of ideological elements that it is hard to
classify.
** Danish governments and Dutch Rutte I are minority coalitions supported by populist parties in formal
agreements.
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Contested Issue 7: Do populists oppose EU integration?
Much has been said about populists and their critical relation to EU integration. Indeed,
many populists are sceptical of EU integration. Thus, radical right populists, such as the
French National Front (Front National, FN, now Rassemblement National, RN) and the
Dutch Freedom Party campaign against EU integration, linking it with immigration
and a loss of national sovereignty. In a similar vein, UKIP was, of course, a prime motor
and backer of Brexit.
However, caution is needed. Early in the 1990s, many populist parties were less critical
of EU integration. Thus the Northern League in Italy was pro-Europe, viewing the EU as an
alternative to the corrupt national politicians and an instrument in promoting regional
autonomy (Zaslove 2011). Even parties such as the French FN were not overtly opposed to
EU integration. With the rise of left-wing parties such as Podemos, the German Left Party
(Die Linke) and the Dutch Socialist Party (SP), it has become increasingly clear that
opposition to the EU is not an essential feature of populism. For one, a party such as
Podemos is critical of the EU but does not advocate withdrawing from the EU. Also Dutch
and German left-wing populist parties are often critical of EU integration on economic
grounds, but may even be supportive of increasing EU powers when it comes to questions
of immigration. Other parties, such as the Five Star Movement in Italy can often be
ambiguous. Indeed, the founder of the 5SM, Beppe Grillo, is more critical of the EU
than the current party leader Luigi Di Maio. At the same time, the current Italian coalition
consisting of the Lega and the Five Star Movement has gone to great lengths to emphasize
that the coalition will not seek to hold a referendum on the euro nor will it support
withdrawing from the EU.
Contested Issue 8: Is populism a temporary phenomenon?
In the public debate, the implicit expectation is that the rise of populism is circumstantial,
that mainstream parties are capable of picking up the lost electorate, that the electorate will
understand the dangers populism poses to society and that populists, once invited to
govern, will either fail or transform into a mainstream party. However, academic studies
suggest that populism is not a temporary phenomenon as it is embedded in larger
structural, thus more permanent, transformations: socio-economic changes, changing
party systems, and changing notions of authority (Zaslove 2008; Kriesi et al., 2012;
Mudde 2018).
The variety of populisms that exist must be seen in the context of the structural changes
emanating from the changing nature of our economies, the changing nature of employment,
and also the advent of developments such as internationalmigration (cf. Kriesi et al. 2012). As
noted above, populism is a thin-centred ideology. Thus, there is not a single populist response
to these events. Rather populistmovements that combine populismwith an attached ideology
have become important actors representing those who feel the brunt of unemployment,
economic restructuring, and/or the changing fabric of their neighbourhoods.
As Cas Mudde (2018) points out, the rise of cognitive mobilisation (that is, the
notion that citizens are more critical of their political leaders and are less likely to follow
them blindly) implies that the voters’ relationships with elites have changed. Populists
are also part and parcel of the changing nature of party systems. Former mainstream
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parties (esp. Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties) no longer dominate
party systems, which have become more fragmented with the rise of a plethora of new
actors, some of which are populist. These developments have created new opportunities
for populist actors (for an extensive argument, see Wolinetz and Zaslove 2018a).
Thus, even in the very unlikely situation that pressing issues such as immigration and
economic restructuring were to be solved, it is unlikely that populism would completely
disappear (Mudde 2018). When politicians and media pundits speak about defeating
populism, their comments are misplaced. For instance, in 2017, relief was expressed
when Dutch populist Geert Wilders’ PVV failed to become the largest party in parliament
(BBC 2017). Similar reactions occurred with respect to the FN after the French elections
that year (Erlanger and Smale 2017). Nevertheless, 2018 witnessed the rise of the Lega and
M5S in Italy. Populism is mostly likely to remain a political force for the foreseeable future.
How strong and successful it will prove to be will depend in large part on the actions of the
populist parties and their non-populist opponents.
Contested Issue 9: Is populism a domestic phenomenon?
One of the weaknesses of the Comparative Politics discipline is its dismissal of International
Relations as an important explanatory factor for domestic politics (the reverse, but to
a lesser degree, could be said of the IR discipline). Yet, in order to understand the rise and
electoral fortune of populist parties, it is vital to take the consequences of international
politics into account. Moreover, IR considerations can occasionally aﬀect the substantive
ideology that the thin-centred ideology populists choose to embrace. Consequently, this
also helps understand what kind of foreign policies such populists are likely to pursue.
International politics create an ideological vacuum that oﬀers populists opportunities.
The surge of contemporary populism is intimately linked to the end of the Cold War
around 1989-92. The disappearances of democracies’ mortal geopolitical and ideological
enemy meant that the tacit or explicit premise of postwar democratic politics had
disappeared: the unspoken agreement between centre-right and centre-left parties that
competition for power should take place among parties that accepted Western democ-
racy and that would prevent the rise to power of communist or other anti-systemic
parties. In the past, dominant coalitions or single-party rule were taken for granted: this
might run against the democratic idea of alternation, but at least they kept the anti-
democrats at bay. After 1992, this was no longer necessary.
Indeed, we witnessed an end to the dominance of Christian Democrats in Belgium,
Italy and the Netherlands. Although Social Democrats ﬁrst rejoiced at the end of the
ideological dominance of the centre-right, it soon became clear that they would be
punished too; Sweden saw the ﬁrst non-Social Democratic government since the 1920s.
In Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and France, the centre left was unable to
continue to occupy the centre ground, despite the optimistic lure of the Third Way.
In Latin America also, the geopolitical changes ensured that Russia and the United
States were less intimately involved in the domestic politics of the region, thus altering
the political opportunity structures for domestic political forces.
Of course, the rise of populist parties was not the case across all Western European
democracies: the Lega Nord in Italy, the SVP in Switzerland, and the People’s Party (Dansk
Folkeparti, DF) inDenmark had been successful long before the BerlinWall came down. Also
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the rise of Green parties since the 1970s had slowly created a ﬁssure inWestern democracies.
Yet, the end of the Cold War created a vast momentum in which citizens did not embrace
Fukuyama’s proclamation that history had ended in favour of democracy as we know it, but
started to pose questions regarding the future of their societies. This momentum gained
prominence particularly in Europe because the end of the Cold War coincided with the
intensiﬁcation of the European integration process and the advent of an intensiﬁed phase in
economic and ﬁnancial globalisation. Combined, these international political developments
made citizens uncertain of having control over European and global processes, as well of the
capacities of their governments to control such developments, thus ushering in a latent
legitimacy crisis of democratic government. Such doubts regarding eﬀective policymaking
capacity have re-entered the debate with the migratory ﬂows that ensued from international
and civil conﬂicts in North Africa and the Middle East.
In Central and Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War opened up the can of worms
that the First World War and the interbellum had sealed oﬀ for decades. The geopolitical
conﬂicts in the Balkans that had been left open at Versailles, the frustrated democratic
experiments in Czechoslovakia, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the interbellum,
coupled with the delegitimisation of the communist discourse produced fertile grounds for
populists riding the nationalist wave. They reintroduced old cleavages regarding national
identity, complicated by the need to position themselves vis-à-vis the old communist order.
International politics oﬀers new ideologies to combine with populism’s thin-centred
ideology. This process operates in two ways: international developments oﬀer new
modes to juxtapose the pure people versus the bad elite. Globalisation oﬀers populists
global moguls, especially in ﬁnance, to blame for the plight of the trampled-upon people.
This position is often espoused by left-wing populists, such as the Dutch SP, the Greek
Syriza, France’s La France Insoumie (Unsubmissive France), and Germany’s Die Linke.
European integration oﬀers an opportunity to point a ﬁnger at technical eurocrats,
especially in the European Commission. This has been the centre argument of UKIP
and has, in diﬀerent phases, been the position of the Dutch PVV, the Italian Lega and
M5S, and the French FN (now RN). The breakup of communism has provided an
opportunity to blame the elite for having agreed to the post WWII territorial status quo.
This is particularly true in Hungary where Fidesz, pressured by the even more nationalist
Jobbik (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, Movement for a Better Hungary) pursues
a nationalist agenda, but also in FPÖ-governed Austria which, after the end of the Cold
War, raised the issues of the Sudeten Germans and, recently, politicized the South Tyrol
issue when it started to grant South Tyrolians Austrian citizenship in addition to their
Italian citizenship. International politics have also oﬀered opportunities to mobilise like-
minded populists: in Latin America in the 2000s, Venezuelan Hugo Chavez’ anti-
Americanism not only helped him mobilise domestic supporters, but also strengthened
the hand of left-wing populists in Ecuador and Bolivia.
At the same time, international developments oﬀer opportunities to embrace a speciﬁc
ideology to complement populism’s thin-centred ideology. The end of the Cold War (and
the advent of globalisation) have helped invoke old fashioned nationalism. Globalisation
has made it possible not only to embrace transnational socialism but also to welcome the
free market (as in the cases of the Dutch LPF and the Italian FI).
Populists aﬀect a country’s foreign policy. The international/domestic nexus also operates in
the other direction. The more popular populists become and the more their success is linked
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to policy issues that are related to global aﬀairs, themore likely it is that governments will take
populist positions into account in their foreign policies. This need not be the case only with
a populist party in government, such as the Austrian FPÖ, or M5S and Lega in Italy. It can
also aﬀect mainstream parties which, fearing the polls, feel they can only ride the populist
wave if they move closer to them. The eﬀect of populist parties on foreign policy depends on
three factors: a) the relative vulnerability of government to populist politics; b) the speciﬁc
deﬁnition of the pure people and the corrupt elite; and c) the speciﬁc ideology a populist party
chooses to borrow from. Notably, countries may adjust their policies in diﬀerent directions:
more protectionist in trade, less committed to multilateralism, less open to refugees and
migrants, less open to deepening integration schemes, unless this is part of challenging
a regional hegemon (as in Latin America where populists have attempted to become less
dependent on the US) (Verbeek and Zaslove 2017).
Conclusions
Above we have identiﬁed nine contested issues surrounding populism. They make it possible
to approach populism in a more analytical manner without necessarily abandoning the ﬁrm
defence of contemporary democracy. Importantly, we need to develop diﬀerent, yet related
research programs based on the diﬀerent dimensions of the populist phenomenon. The
notion of a thin-centred ideology looks particularly promising because it oﬀers
a conceptualisation that allows for comparison across time and space. In addition, it makes
it possible to link up populist leaders (parties) and followers in a systematic fashion. The dual
quality of the notion of a thin-centred ideology, allowing for variation in both the people/elite
divide and the ‘added ideology’, will prevent systematic biases towards any one type of
populism. The additional concept of populism as a strategy permits the incorporation of
mainstream parties as part of the playing ﬁeld. Having thus mapped out the players, we need
to be aware of context: international developments as well as electoral and party systems aﬀect
the way the game is being played. Only in this way will academia ride the populist storm.
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